Abstract-As Internet applications have become more diverse in recent years, users having heavy demand for online video services are more willing to pay higher prices for better services than light users that mainly use e-mails and instant messages. This encourages the Internet service providers (ISPs) to explore service differentiation so as to optimize their profits and allocation of network resources. Much prior work has focused on the viability of network service differentiation by comparing with the case of a single-class service. However, the optimal service differentiation for an ISP subject to resource constraints has remained unsolved. In this paper, we establish an optimal control framework to derive the analytical solution to an ISP's optimal service differentiation, i.e., the optimal service qualities and associated prices. By analyzing the structures of the solution, we reveal how an ISP should adjust the service qualities and prices in order to meet varying capacity constraints and users' characteristics. We also obtain the conditions under which ISPs have strong incentives to implement service differentiation and whether regulators should encourage such practices.
I. INTRODUCTION

R
ECENT years have witnessed increasing commercialization of the Internet and considerably rising diversities of Internet applications and users. Users having heavy demand for quality-sensitive services such as online video services are often willing to pay higher prices for better service qualities, while light users tend to have low willingness-to-pay for elementary services such as e-mails and instant messages. Such heterogeneity in the users' characteristics has rendered the traditional practice of uniform prices, regardless of the quality of service, inefficient in both generating profits and allocating network capacity. In light of this, there has been tremendous interest in designing pricing strategies to provide differentiated services. Many schemes [20] - [22] have been designed, e.g., Paris Metro Pricing (PMP) [20] . In such a scheme, network is partitioned into several logically separated channels, each of which uses a fraction of the entire network capacity and a different price, and the channels with higher prices attract fewer users but provide better services.
An important theoretical question naturally arises: what is the optimal service differentiation for an ISP subject to its capacity constraints so as to maximize its profit? Despite the vast literature on network service differentiation, this question has remained unanswered. Prior work [3] , [8] , [12] , [23] mostly focused on the viability of PMP-type of differentiation and did not investigate the optimal service differentiation. To tackle the optimal service differentiation, we delve into the ISP's decision-making process. In deciding the optimal strategy, an ISP needs to answer two questions: what are the service qualities to offer and what are the associated prices for them. For the former question, even the range of the optimal set of service qualities is hard to determine; for the latter one, it needs to find the optimal quality-price mapping for the chosen service qualities. The problem is actually a dynamic optimization problem in a functional space and the domain of the price mapping is to be determined. As the realized quality in a service class depends on the allocated network capacity and the aggregate user demand, which is determined by the available service qualities and the corresponding prices, another major challenge is to model the ISP's capacity allocation plan subject to network capacity constraints and determine the realized quality in terms of network congestion. In other words, ISPs need to allocate limited network capacity to each service class so as to guarantee the promised service quality.
In view of the complexity of the optimal service differentiation, the common practice of prior work is to adopt simplifying assumptions. For instance, Jain et al. [8] assumed the ISP only provides two service classes. Shakkottai et al. [23] overlooked the congestion externalities and considered a loose upper bound (under the first degree price discrimination) of the ISP's optimal profits instead. Chau et al. [3] considered a finite number of service classes and analyzed the viability of differentiated pricing, but did not solve the optimal strategy.
In this work, we solve an ISP's optimal service differentiation in generic settings by explicitly modeling the ISP's capacity allocation plan subject to network capacity constraints and incorporating the dual approach in microeconomics [17] to transform the problem into a tractable optimal control problem. As for the network capacity constraints, we consider two typical scenarios: a) the fixed capacity scenario, where an ISP has limited network capacity, and b) the variable capacity scenario, where an ISP can invest to expand the capacity of its network infrastructure. Our findings include the following.
• We formulate a profit maximization problem subject to capacity constraints under an optimal control framework and derive the analytical optimal service differentiation of an ISP, i.e., the qualities and prices of service classes.
• We find that the optimal differentiation strategy offers service classes with sufficiently high qualities and prices such that low-value users will not join the services, even under abundant capacity. We also characterize an ISP's market share by users' virtual valuation function [19] . • We show that when an ISP expands its capacity, it should increase market share by offering more premium service classes and reducing prices. When there are more highend users, it is optimal for the ISP to offer a narrower range of premium service classes with higher prices.
• We show that if network capacity is scarce, then an ISP has strong incentives to implement service differentiation and regulators should encourage such practices in order to improve the total user surplus; otherwise, it is optimal for the ISP to provide a single-class service. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to characterize and analytically derive an ISP's optimal service differentiation subject to network capacity constraints. We believe that our findings will help ISPs to better price network services and guide regulators to design regulations. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses related work. Section III presents the model and formulate the ISP's profit-maximizing problem as a nested optimization problem. In Section IV, we derive the analytical solution of the optimal service differentiation and study the structure of the solution. We reveal the sensitivity of the solution under varying market environments in Section V and conclude in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Much theoretical economics literature has considered product differentiation. Mussa and Rosen [18] analyzed the optimal product mix for a monopolist offering several qualities of a product to consumers with different preferences for quality. Maskin and Riley [14] characterized the optimal selling strategy of a monopolist, and Champsaur and Rochet [1] studied the product differentiation for two competing firms. Both adopt a common assumption that the quality of the product can be unilaterally decided by the seller. However, these models are inapplicable to network services because the quality of services are influenced by both the user demand and the network capacity. Chander and Leruth [2] studied the best strategy of a monopolist in the presence of congestion effects. Nevertheless, they did not provide the solution of the optimal strategy and their congestion model does not capture the scarcity of capacity in network markets.
Various pricing schemes for providing differentiated network services has been proposed [20] - [22] . In particular, Paris Metro Pricing (PMP) [20] has attracted considerable attention for its simplicity. Since PMP does not guarantee the quality of service for users, which depends on the spontaneous user demand, its viability and effectiveness need to be established. Prior studies [3] , [6] , [8] , [12] , [23] addressed the viability of PMP. Shakkottai et al. [23] characterized the types of environments in which simple flatrate pricing is efficient in extracting profits. Lee et al. [10] extended the model of [23] to explicitly consider the congestion externalities and indicate that when the network is congested, a simple flat-rate pricing is inefficient in extracting profits. Jain et al. [8] analyzed the ISP's profit-maximizing problem when the ISP is restricted to provider two service classes. Chau et al. [3] provided sufficient condition of congestion externalities for the viability of PMP. Several studies investigated the competition among service providers. For example, Gibbens et al. [6] analyzed the competition between two ISP's and show that in any equilibrium competitive outcome, both ISPs offer a single-class service. Ma [12] studied usage-based pricing scheme and competition among oligopolistic service provides. Ma and Misra [13] studied service differentiation of ISPs and tried to address the net neutrality debate. These studies focused on the viability of PMP and its variants by comparing with a single-class service.
Moreover, several recent works studied service differentiation under specific contexts such as cloud computing [5] , [9] and premium peering [11] . Ding et al. [5] proposed Abacus, a generic cloud system resource management framework that provides service differentiation via auction-based mechanism. Lakew et al. [9] proposed a performance-based service differentiation scheme that adjusts to workload dynamics. Ma [11] considered the various premium peering options provided by access providers and study whether content providers will choose to peer. Our work, however, focuses on the theoretical problem of solving the ISP's optimal service differentiation subject to capacity constraints. We establish an optimal control framework to derive the analytical solution to the ISP's optimal service differentiation and characterize its properties.
III. MODEL
We consider an ISP that wants to differentiate its services among a continuum of heterogeneous users. From a profit maximization perspective, the ISP should offer as many service classes as possible so as to differentiate heterogeneous users; however, due to operational constraints in practice, an ISP usually provides a limited number of service classes. Since the ultimate goal of our work is to understand the structure of an ISP's optimal service differentiation and draw insightful conclusions, we choose to consider the ideal scenario where the ISP is able to offer a continuum of service classes. This idealization enables us to abstract away the orthogonal operational issues faced by the ISP and focus on understanding the ISP's optimal structure of service differentiation under limited network capacity. To help readers grasp the key ingredients of our model, we first present an n-class scenario under which the ISP provides a finite number n of services classes, and then formulate the n-class profit maximization problem. Finally, we transition our model and profit maximization problem into a continuum scenario where the ISP is able to provide unlimited number of service classes.
A. ISP and User Model
We first present the n-class scenario where the ISP offers service classes 1, 2, · · · , n. As for the pricing scheme, we assume that the ISP adopt the flat-rate pricing scheme and base our subsequent analysis on it. We will come back to this and discuss usage-based pricing schemes in subsection IV-E. For each service class i, we denote p i as the price and q i as the congestion level, a measure of service quality. Correspondingly, we denote p {p i : i = 1, · · · , n} and q {q i : i = 1, · · · , n} as the price and congestion vectors. Here the price vector p is exogenous while the congestion level q depends on both the actual demand and allocated capacity of each service class.
Once the menu of services (p, q) is decided, users will make choices according to their preferences over the bundles
We characterize each user by her intrinsic value of the network service θ ∈ Θ = [0, 1], which models the user's maximum achievable value when network congestion does not exist. We denote f (θ) and F (θ) as the probability density and cumulative distribution functions of users' value, and assume that f (θ) is continuously differentiable and strictly positive over Θ. When a user with value θ chooses a service class (p, q), we define her utility as
which can be interpreted as follows.
• v(·) is a satisfaction discount function which captures the negative effect of congestion on users' intrinsic values.
• θv(q) is the user's achieved value over the service under a congestion level q, and thus u(p, q; θ) is the user's net surplus, i.e., the achieved value θv(q) minus the price p. This models that the user's value is at maximum without congestion, i.e., q = 0, and decreases to zero when the network is heavily congested, i.e., q → 1. We assume that users are individually rational, i.e., any user with value θ chooses either to join the service class k that yields the highest nonnegative utility, i.e., k = arg max j u(p j , q j ; θ), or to opt out of the ISP's services if joining any service class induces a negative utility, i.e., u(p i , q i ; θ) < 0 for any service class i. To unify the above two cases, we assume the existence of a dummy service class 0 which satisfies p 0 = 0 and q 0 = 1, and therefore, any user can always choose service class 0 to guarantee a zero utility.
We denote the set of user types that choose the service class i as Θ i (p, q), defined by
Consequently, the population of users that choose service class i can be calculated as
B. Network Congestion and Capacity Allocation
Since the ISP usually has limited network capacity, it needs to design a capacity allocation plan to guarantee the promised service quality in terms of congestion in each service class. In general, the required amount of network capacity by a service class is determined by its promised service congestion and user population. In the n-class scenario, for each service class i, we model the implied capacity to guarantee a congestion level q i under the aggregate user population The form of implied capacity function in Assumption 1 models the capacity sharing [3] , [6] nature of network services, under which the total workload is distributed among the processors with some fixed total capacity. 1 The unit capacity function w(q) models the capacity required to maintain the congestion level q given that the service class has a unit user demand. Under Assumption 1, the implied capacity function satisfies C(d, q) = C(d, q), indicating that users will not perceive any difference in terms of congestion after service partitioning or multiplexing. This form is a generalization of C(d, q) = d/q (to see this, let w(q) = 1/q), which has been considered in much prior work [3] , [6] , [8] , [12] .
We model the ISP's capacity allocation plan by a vector c {c i : ∀i = 1, · · · , n}, where c i is the capacity allocated to service class i. To guarantee the congestion level of each service class, the ISP's capacity allocation plan c must satisfy
Intuitively, when the ISP has limited network capacity and some of the inequalities in (2) do not bind, it probably has not taken full advantage of the capacity and can gain more profits by readjusting the menu of services. We will strictly characterize this in Theorem 1 in Section IV-C. We have thus far established the relationship between the ISP's menu (p, q) of services and the capacity allocation plan c. We next proceed to analyze the ISP's limitation in capacity and formulate the ISP's profit-maximizing problem.
C. n-Class Profit Maximization Problem
In this subsection, we formulate the ISP's profit maximization problem under the n-class scenario. We consider two typical network capacity constraints of the ISP as follows.
• (Fixed Capacity) The ISP's services are supported by an existing network infrastructure and hence face a maximum network capacity, denoted by C M .
• (Variable Capacity) The ISP may invest to expand its network infrastructure. In this scenario, the ISP needs to find out the optimal amount of capacity to consume (invest).
We capture the cost of consuming capacity c in total by S(c), a continuously nondecreasing function. The ISP aims to find the optimal service menu (p, q) and the capacity allocation plan c subject to the capacity constraints in order to maximize its profits. In the fixed capacity scenario, the allocated capacity should not exceed the maximum capacity, i.e.,
Because the ISP's profit can be expressed as
its profit maximization problem can be formulated as follows.
Likewise, in the variable capacity scenario, the ISP's investment in capacity is characterized by S(
, and the profit maximization problem is formulated as follows.
Intuitively, when the number of service classes n increases, the ISP can make more profit. Thus, if we want to understand the structure of the ISP's optimal service differentiation while abstracting away the orthogonal operational issues, we should allow n to go to +∞, which is exactly our ideal continuum scenario.
D. The Continuum Scenario
Thus far, we have formulated the ISP's profit maximization problems as nested optimization problems with equilibrium constraints in the n-class scenario. Now we allow the ISP to offer a continuum of service classes and revisit the model and profit maximization problem.
Since there may be unlimited number of service classes that an ISP wants to provide, we shall use the congestion level q, rather than an integer index, to refer to each service class. We denote Q ⊆ [0, 1] as the set of provided service congestion levels, 2 and represent the ISP's pricing and capacity allocation plan by two mappings p(·) : Q → R + and c(·) : Q → R + , which map levels of congestion to the corresponding capacities and prices respectively.
Note that the set Q and the mappings p(·) and c(·) are the continuous counterparts of the vectors q, p and c in the n-class scenario, respectively. Given the new notations, we denote the set of user types that choose the service class q ∈ Q as Θ(q; p(·), Q), defined by
Consequently, the population of users that choose service class q ∈ Q can be calculated as
As mentioned before, we assume that Q contains a dummy service class with congestion level q = 1 and p(q) = c(q) = 0. and the ISP's revenue can be expressed as
Furthermore, the total capacity consumption is
Finally, we can formulate the profit-maximization problem in the fixed capacity scenario as
Likewise, the profit maximization problem in the variable capacity scenario is formulated as follows.
IV. OPTIMAL CONTROL FRAMEWORK Two of the main challenges in solving the nested optimization problems (5) and (6) include: 1) the set of optimal service classes Q * is hard to predetermine, and 2) the sets of user demand Θ(q; p(·), Q) are subject to the nonlinear user utility maximization problems which require different treatments depending on the connectedness of Q. To address these problems, we need a unified and succinct representation of the ISP's strategy. In the rest of the section, we first introduces a dual representation of the ISP's strategy, by which we reformulates the profit maximization problem using the dual approach. Then we present the analytic solution to the ISP's optimal service differentiation and study its characteristics. Finally we discuss how our analysis can be extended to handle the usage-based pricing scheme.
A. Dual Approach
We introduce a dual approach in economics [1] , [17] to describe the ISP's decision in terms of the user's choice, rather than the levels of congestion and prices.
Definition 2: For any type θ, we define q(θ) as the chosen service quality that maximizes the user's utility, satisfying
The indirect utility of user type θ is defined by
When there exist multiple optimal choices, we assume that user θ chooses one from them according to her own tie breaking criteria. We shall see in the end of this subsection that the user's choice will not affect the correctness of our subsequent analysis. Based on this, it is convenient to rewrite (7) as:
Given a finite set (or more generally a compact set) of choices, the optimal choice q(θ) always exists. The indirect utility V (θ) defines the maximum utility that can be achieved by users of type θ under their optimal choice of services. The advantage of the dual approach is that the ISP's strategy (Q, p(·)) can be equivalently represented by the user's indirect utility V (·) and optimal choice q(·), both of which have favorable properties and a fixed domain, i.e., Θ = [0, 1]. Next, we characterize the properties of q(·) and V (·).
Lemma 1: The user's optimal choice function q(·):
Lemma 1 states that a user with higher value would not choose a service class with worse congestion, and whatever the user's criteria of breaking ties of optimal choices is, the monotonicity of q(·) always holds. An immediate consequence is that q(·) is piecewise continuous.
By Definition 2, any user of type θ's maximum utility V (θ) can also be expressed by the following equation:
Furthermore, according to the envelope theorem [15] , V (·) is absolutely continuous and hence differentiable almost everywhere, with its derivative satisfying
or the equivalent integral form:
The following lemma allows us to represent an ISP's pricing strategy using V (·) and q(·).
Lemma 2: Let q(·) and V (·) be any two mappings from Θ to R and Q the range of q(·). If q(·) is nonincreasing and
By the envelope theorem [15] , the indirect utility function V (·) and the user's choice function q(·) meet the equation condition in Lemma 2, i.e.,
Besides, Lemma 1 indicates that q(·) is indeed nonincreasing. Therefore, given the user's choice function q(·) and an initial level V (0) of the indirect utility, we can recover the ISP's service differentiation strategy via Lemma 2 as follows.
• The set of provided service qualities is
, where ϑ is the type that satisfies q(ϑ) = q. Given the above discussions, the ISP's profit maximization problem boils down to finding the corresponding user's choice function q * (·) and the indirect utility level V * (0) under the optimal service differentiation scheme Q * and p * (·).
4
Since the domain of q(θ) is given ([0, 1]), this dual approach alleviates much of the technical difficulties. We remark that the above dual approach allows us to handle the user's different tie breaking criteria in a unified manner. Although the user's choices lead to different user choice functions q(·) when she can choose from multiple service classes to maximize her utility, we are searching for the optimal service differentiation in the entire space
, therefore all of the user's choices are taken into consideration and we can safely rewrite (7) as (9).
B. Optimal Control Framework
We demonstrate that the ISP's profit maximization problem can be transformed into an optimal control problem, the solution to which is the user's choice function q * (·) and the indirect utility level V * (·) under the optimal service differentiation. Lemma 3: Under the ISP's optimal service differentiation scheme, the initial level of indirect utility satisfies V * (0) = 0. Lemma 3 states that under the ISP's optimal service differentiation, users with the lowest valuation, i.e., θ = 0, obtains zero utility. Consequently, we can set the indirect utility level V (0) to be zero when searching for the optimal strategy.
To calculate the total profits of the ISP using V (·) and q(·), we can perform integration with respect to the user type θ instead of over the service class domain Q, i.e.,
The consumed capacity can be calculated by integrating the unit capacity function w(q) over the user types θ as follows.
Lemma 4: The total consumption of network capacity in the system can be calculated by
By Lemma 4, we can define the capacity consumption function W (θ) to measure the aggregate capacity consumption by users with valuation lower than θ.
Definition 3: The capacity consumption function is defined as
In particular, W (1) is the total capacity consumption of the entire system.
Lemma 5: The user's choice function q * (·) under the optimal service differentiation can be determined by solving the following optimal control problems. 4 We take a detour to show the existence and uniqueness of optimal strategy. In the rest of the section, we first transform the ISP's profit-maximizing problem to an equivalent optimal control problem, and find out the unique candidate solution that satisfies the necessary condition, i.e., the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle [4] . Finally we use the sufficient conditions to prove that the solution is indeed the optimal strategy. We leave the details to the proof of Theorem 1 in the Appendix. a) For the fixed capacity scenario:
and
b) For the variable capacity scenario:
The above problems (13) and (14) are more tractable than the original ones (5) and (6) because they are optimal control problems in Bolza form [4] . In these two optimal control problems, the user's choice function q(·) is the control variable in the functional space {q(·) ∈ R [0,1] |q(·) nonincreasing} and the indirect utility function V (·) and capacity consumption function W (·) are the so-called state variables.
C. Optimal Solution
Notice that the monotonicity constraint on q(·) requires special treatments. In particular, we adopt the following steps.
• We first consider a relaxed optimal control problem in which the monotonicity constraint is removed. By using the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle [4] , we find a candidate optimal control solution q(·) to the relaxed problem.
• Since q(·) only satisfies the necessary condition, we need to check whether q(·) satisfies the sufficient conditions for optimality. If so, then q(·) is indeed an optimal control of the relaxed problem and we proceed to the next step.
• If q(·) also meets the monotonicity constraint, then it is also an optimal control of the original problem (5), i.e. q * (·) = q(·); otherwise, we conduct further analysis based on q(·). We use the fixed capacity scenario to illustrate the key steps in solving the relaxed optimal control problem. We first define the Hamiltonian H as follows:
where λ 1 (·) and λ 2 (·) are the so-called co-state variables satisfying the following transversality conditions:
It immediately follows that λ 1 (θ) = F (θ) − 1 and λ 2 (θ) is a constant over [0, 1]. If all the network capacity is consumed, i.e., W (1)−C M = 0, the slackness condition gives λ 2 (1) < 0; otherwise λ 2 (1) = 0. In either case, we define λ 2 (θ) = −μ where μ is a nonnegative real constant. The economic interpretation of the Hamiltonian and the co-state variables are as follows. The co-state constant μ is the shadow price of the network capacity which evaluates the marginal contribution to total profits contributed by per additional unit of capacity. The Hamiltonian H is the surrogate profit the ISP extracts from the users of type θ, which consists of three components on the right-hand side of (15) . The first component is the direct impact of the control variable q(·) on the object function [θv(q(θ))−V (θ)]f (θ). The control variable q(θ) also has an indirect impact on the object function: it influences the value of V (θ + δθ) in the next infinitesimal type by the differential V (θ) = v(q(θ)), which is captured by the second component. Moreover, the third component characterizes the cost of capacity consumption.
According to the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle, if an optimal control q(·) exists, then along the optimal trajectories, q(·) is the point-wise maxima of the Hamiltonian H: (16) where V (·) is the optimal trajectory of state, governed by V (θ) = q(θ), ∀θ. The economic interpretation is that to maximize its total profits, the ISP has to maximize the surrogate profit it extracts from each type of users. Neglecting the components irrelevant to q in (16), we see that q(·) is the point-wise maxima of
Thus far we have illustrated the first step, i.e., to use the Maximum Principle to find possible candidate optimal control q(·). Due to space limitation, we show the remaining steps in the proof of Theorem 1 and proceed to present our results, i.e., q * (·) and the optimal service differentiation Q * and p * (·). We make the following definitions and assumptions to facilitate further analysis.
Definition 4: The virtual valuation function is defined as
Assumption 2: The virtual valuation function G(θ) has a unique zero point θ 0 on (0, 1) and is strictly increasing on (θ 0 , 1).
The virtual valuation function G(θ) is first defined by Myerson in [19] designing revenue-optimal auctions. One sufficient condition for Assumption 2 is the standard monotone hazard rate assumption in the mechanism design literature such as [7] . Assumption 2 is satisfied by many common distributions, e.g., normal, exponential and beta distributions. Note that the G(·) is the coefficient of v(q) in (17) . decreasing over the interval (0, 1) .
Definition 5: The virtual capacity function is defined as h(q) w (q)/v (q). Assumption 3: The virtual capacity function h(q) is
The virtual capacity function h(·) is defined as the ratio of the marginal unit capacity w (q) needed to support service quality at a congestion level q to the marginal value of a user θ whose best choice of quality is q. h(q) measures the marginal capacity needed so as to marginally increase the user value at the level q of congestion in the system. 
We remark that the optimal control framework is not dependent on Assumption 2 and 3, and the main motive for us to adopt them is that they allow us to derive the analytical solution in a clean form. Without these assumptions, we can still derive the solution by following the steps introduced in the beginning of this subsection, however the discussion of the monotonicity constraint may be cumbersome and few new insights will be discovered according to numerical experiments. Therefore, we adopt Assumption 2 and 3 to derive a concise analytic solution of the optimal control problem and present our main results as follows.
Definition 7: Under Assumption 2, we denote G −1 (θ) as the inverse function of G(θ) over the interval (θ 0 , 1).
Theorem 1: For the fixed capacity scenario, letC a) The user choice function:
b) The marginal user 5θ that uses the network services:
c) The capacity equation:
Otherwise, the ISP's optimal differentiation is to provide a single-class service, which satisfies Q = {0} and p * (0) = θ 0 . Theorem 1 characterizes the optimal user choice function q * (·) for the fixed capacity scenario. It states that if the ISP's network capacity is limited, i.e. C M <C, then all the inequalities in (2) will be binding under the ISP's optimal service differentiation. On the other hand, when the ISP's capacity is abundant, i.e. C M ≥C, it is optimal for the ISP to offer a single-class service. In particular, because w(0) defines the unit capacity cost for supporting the best quality, i.e., q = 0,C = [1 − F (θ 0 )]w(0) defines a capacity threshold that captures the costs of supporting the best quality for the 5 The marginal userθ is the type of user that is indifferent between joining and opting-out of the services. Users with valuations belowθ do not join the services while users with valuations aboveθ do. population of users whose values are larger than the value threshold θ 0 .
With necessary modifications, we can apply similar procedures to derive the optimal solution for the variable capacity scenario as follows.
Theorem 2: For the variable capacity scenario, if the cost function S(·) is convex with S
(0) = 0, the optimal user choice function q * (·) and the associated capacity consumption W * (1) are uniquely determined by the following set of equations.
a) The user choice function:
b) The marginal userθ that uses the network services:
After we have obtained q * (·) by the above theorems, the optimal service differentiation scheme becomes straightforward.
Corollary 1: Under the ISP's optimal service differentiation, the service classes form an interval
, and the associated prices satisfy
where ϑ is the user type such that q * (ϑ) = q. Furthermore, p * (·) is continuously differentiable and decreasing in q.
D. Characteristics of the Optimal Solution
In this subsection, we study the structures and properties of the optimal service differentiation scheme and the corresponding user choices. We first concentrate on the fixed capacity scenario and the following corollary characterizes the shadow price μ of network capacity.
Corollary 2: For any given user distribution F (·) satisfying Assumption 2, the shadow price μ decreases in the system capacity C M with the asymptotic limit lim
Corollary 2 intuitively states that the marginal value of capacity decreases when the ISP has more capacity, a common diminishing return effect, and this marginal value drops to zero when the capacity becomes abundant.
This next result explicitly shows the type of users that will be served under an ISP's optimal service differentiation.
Corollary 3: Under an ISP's optimal service differentiation, users with values lower than the marginal user valueθ will not use any network service. In particular, the marginal user valueθ satisfies that a) if h(1) = 0,θ is the unique solution to the equation
G(θ) =θ − 1 − F (θ) f (θ) = 0, i.e.θ = θ 0 . b) if h(1) > 0,
θ depends on both the user distribution F (·) and the fixed capacity C M . Given any F (·),θ decreases in C M with the asymptotic limit lim
Corollary 3 states that the optimal service differentiation offers the service classes with sufficiently low levels of congestion and high prices such that the users with low value will not use any service, even when the network capacity is abundant. Based on Definition 5, the virtual capacity h(1) measures the marginal capacity needed by the ISP so as to marginally increase the user value under the worst congestion level, i.e., q = 1. Thus, h(1) > 0 and h(1) = 0 indicate the conditions whether marginally increasing the user value under the worst congestion level requires capacity or not, respectively. The intuition behind Corollary 3 is that by offering premium services with high quality and high prices, the gains from the high-end users outweigh the loss of low-end market share.
Next, we turn to the structure of the optimal choices of users with values θ aboveθ. Lettingθ min{G −1 (μh (1)), 1}, we rewrite their choices q * (θ) as follows.
Over the interval [θ,θ], a user of type θ joins the service class q * (θ) such that G(θ) = μh(q * (θ)), i.e., the user's virtual valuation G(θ) equals the cost of maintaining service class q * (θ), which is the shadow price multiplied by the virtual capacity. In other words, under the ISP's optimal service differentiation, each user of type θ will choose the service class with highest quality and price that it can afford. Moreover, when h(0) < +∞, the cost of maintaining services is upper bounded by μh(0), and the user's virtual valuation might be higher than this bound. In this case, high-end users will be bunched up in the service class q = 0. The following corollary characterizes this bunching phenomenon. Corollary 4 indicates that the bunching phenomenon only happens when the virtual capacity h(0) < +∞ and the capacity exceeds a certain thresholdĈ. Based on Definition 5, the virtual capacity h(0) measures the marginal capacity needed so as to marginally increase the user value when there is no congestion, i.e. q = 0. Thus, h(0) = +∞ and h(0) < +∞ indicate the conditions whether marginally increasing the user value under a congestion-free network needs infinite capacity or not, respectively.
Corollary 4: When h(0) < +∞, there exists a threshold
We can analyze the solution for the variable capacity scenario in a similar way. In Theorem 2, the marginal price of network capacity at the optimal consumption level W * (1) is S (W * (1)), which plays the same role as the shadow price μ in Theorem 1 and depends on both the user distribution F (·) and the cost function S(·). Therefore, the above discussions can be readily extended to handle the variable capacity scenario.
In summary, Corollaries 3 and 4 show that an ISP's optimal service differentiation scheme always offers service classes with sufficiently low levels of congestion and high prices such that users with low values do not subscribe to the ISP, even if it has abundant network capacity. If the ISP expands its capacity, then its market share should be increased; if the ISP's network capacity is sufficient, i.e., more thanĈ, then it is optimal to bunch up the high-end users in the best service class with q = 0. Furthermore, when the users' valuations lean towards high values, the ISP needs to sacrifice part of the lowend market share and dedicate its capacity to premium service classes for high-end users so as to maximize its profits.
E. Extension to Usage-Based Pricing
We demonstrate how our analysis can be extended to handle usage-based pricing schemes, under which the ISP offers the per-unit service usage price vector p. We interpret θ as a user's value on per-unit service usage. Furthermore, we interpret v(q) as users' volume of transmitted packets under congestion level q and model the user's utility by
which is proportional to the user's network usage and her surplus per usage.
In order to take advantage of the dual approach, we define the indirect utility and user choice as follows. The indirect utility of user type θ is given by V (θ) max q∈Q v(q)(θ −p), and the choice q(θ) of user θ 6 is
Furthermore, according to the envelope theorem, we have V (θ) = v(q(θ)), and the equivalent integral form
Using the dual approach, we formulate the ISP's profit and total capacity consumption as follows.
The ISP's profits is
And the ISP's capacity consumption is
The discussions on the tie breaking criterion in subsection A remain valid here.
Therefore, by defining the capacity consumption function
we can formulate the optimal control problem in the fixed capacity situation as follows.
Comparing the above optimal control problem with (13), we see that under usage-based schemes, w(·)v(·) plays the same role as w(·) in the flat-rate scheme. The intuitive explanation is that the implied capacity per user is now adjusted by the actual service usage. Therefore, if we define ϕ(·) w(·)v(·) and substitute ϕ(·) for w(·) in Lemma 5 and Assumption 2, then all the previous analysis can be carried on and we can smoothly use our optimal control framework to derive the optimal service differentiation under usage-based pricing schemes.
V. CASE STUDY OF OPTIMAL SERVICE DIFFERENTIATION
In this section, we conduct sensitivity analysis of an ISP's optimal service differentiation and the corresponding user behavior by studying typical cases. We first choose the parameters of the system. In particular, we use the exponential form e −q to construct the user's satisfaction discount on congestion level. As we normalize the domain of congestion q to be [0, 1], we adopt a normalized form v(q) = (e −q − e −1 )/(1 − e −1 ) which satisfies v(0) = 1 and v(1) = 0. We further model the implied capacity by the quadratic convex function w(q) = (1−q) 2 , under which the marginal demand of capacity is increasing as the required service quality becomes better, i.e., as q decreases. Under these settings, the virtual capacity function satisfies h(0) < +∞ and h(1) = 0.
A. Impacts of Network Capacity Constraint
We study the sensitivity of the ISP's optimal service differentiation changes respect to network capacity constraint, i.e., the maximum capacity C M in the fixed capacity scenario and the cost function S(·) in the variable capacity scenario.
We first investigate the former one. Fig. 1 plots the ISP's optimal service differentiation (on the left) and the corresponding user's choice function (on the right) when user type θ follows the uniform distribution U [0, 1]. Each curve in the figures represents a different C M and J * is the corresponding optimal profits. We observe that when the maximum capacity C M increases, 1) both the ISP's optimal pricing curve and the user choice curve shift downwards, 2) only users with valuation θ ∈ [0.5, 1] choose the services, 3) when capacity is sufficient, high-end users are bunched onto the service class q = 0, and 4) the ISP's profit rises. The second observation is a demonstration of Corollary 3 that when h(1) = 0, the marginal user of typeθ is independent of C M . Besides, the observed bunching phenomenon is an illustration of Corollary 4. We summarize the other observations in the following corollaries.
Corollary 5: Under a fixed user distribution F (·), denote the ISP's optimal range of service qualities under the maximum capacity C M1 and C M2 as Q 1 and Q 2 , respectively.
Corollary 5 indicates that when the ISP's maximum capacity is larger, its optimal service differentiation offers more premium classes. We also observe that the ISP should decrease the prices to maximize its profit under this scenario.
Corollary 6: Under any user distribution F (·), an ISP's optimal profit J
* increases with its maximum network capacity C M over (0,C) and have the following asymptotic limit:
Corollary 6 states that if an ISP's capacity is not abundant, i.e., C M <C, then it can gain more profits under the optimal service differentiation when its maximum capacity expands.
Next we study the variable capacity scenario. We focus on the impacts of cost function S(·) on the optimal consumption W * (1) of capacity and the profits J. To this end, we choose a family of cost functions parameterized by a single parameter t : S(c) 0, ∀c ∈ [0, 0.1] and S(c) t(c − 0.1) 2 , ∀c ∈ (0.1, +∞). Our settings model the scenario where the ISP's existing capacity equals C = 0.1 and only need to pay for costs of the additional capacity. In general, a larger t measures higher costs for expanding capacity. Fig. 2 plots the optimal consumption W * (1) of capacity (on the left) and the optimal profits J * (on the right) versus the parameter t varying along the x-axis. We observe that both W * (1) and J * decrease with t, which indicates that when the cost of expanding capacity is cheaper, it is optimal for the ISP to purchase more capacity so as to gain more profits. In particular, when t → +∞, the ISP will not invest in any extra capacity and the optimal consumption level is W * (1) = 0.1.
Summary of Implications:
In the fixed capacity scenario, when the ISP increases network capacity, its optimal service differentiation scheme will a) enlarge the range of service congestions by offering more premium services, and b) charge each service class a lower price. In this scenario, the ISP is 7 We also observe that the optimal prices satisfy p 2 (q) < p 1 (q) for all q ∈ Q 1 ∩Q 2 \{1}. However, this observation has not been rigorously proved. Fig. 2 . Impacts of the cost function. Fig. 3 . Optimal pricing under different user distributions able to allocate more capacity for the premium services and attract high-end users to use them so as to increase profits. In the variable capacity scenario, when the cost of capacity is cheaper, the ISP has incentives to purchase more capacity to obtain higher profits.
B. Impacts of User Distribution
In this subsection, we study the sensitivity of the ISP's optimal service differentiation with respect to the user distribution. In particular, we consider a family of distribution functions
If α = 1, the users' values follow the uniform distribution U [0, 1]; otherwise, the users are either leaning towards higher (α > 1) or lower (α < 1) values. Fig. 3 plots the ISP's optimal pricing curves (left) and the corresponding user choice curves (right) under various user distributions and fixed maximum capacity C M = 0.1. We observe that when user valuation shifts towards the higher end, 1) the ISP's optimal pricing curve and the corresponding user choice curve both shift upwards, 2) the ISP offers a narrower range of low congestion services and fewer users choose the network service, 3) the bunching effect vanishes when α is large, and 4) the ISP's profit rises. The second observation is a demonstration of Corollary 3, i.e., when α increases, the marginal user valueθ increases. The third observation is due to the fact that the thresholdC [1 − F (θ 0 )]w(0) increases with the parameter α.
Summary of Implications: When there are more high-value users in the market, the ISP's optimal service differentiation will focus on these high-value users by offering a narrower range of premium service classes and charging higher prices, thus extracting more profits from these high-value users.
C. Comparison With the Optimal Single-Class Service
We evaluate whether an ISP has the incentive to implement service differentiation so as to obtain higher profits. To this end, we use the optimal pricing strategy of a single-class service 8 (p * , q * ) as our benchmark and compare the ISP's profits and the total user surplus under our optimal service differentiation with that under the benchmark. We conduct simulations under the various user distributions. Since the general trends are almost the same, we adopt the uniform distribution U [0, 1] as the representative setting. Fig. 4 plots the ISP's profits J * (on the left) and the total user surplus s 1 0 V (θ)dθ (on the right) versus the maximum capacity C M under the two strategies. We observe that when the capacity is scarce, the ISP has stronger incentives to differentiate services so as to gain more profits. However, as the capacity keeps growing, the increase in profits becomes marginal. This observation is consistent with Corollary 6 and Theorem 1, which state that when C M approachesC, the ISP's profit converges to the upper bound which is reached without the capacity constraints. Fig. 1 also illustrates this: the curve with C M = 0.3345 shows that when capacity expands, the majority of users are bunched up in the best service class q = 0 and the profit gained by service classes q ∈ (0, 1] is small compared to that of the service class q = 0.
The trend of total user surplus s is similar, except for that the increase is also marginal when capacity is scarce. To see this more clearly, we plot the user surplus s versus the user type θ when C M = 0.11 (on the left) and C M = 0.22 (on the right) in Fig. 5 . We observe that under the ISP's optimal service differentiation, more users subscribe to the services. However, when the capacity is insufficient, mid-tier uers are sacrificed to subsidize the high-end and low-end users.
Summary of Implications: The ISP has strong incentives to implement service differentiation if its network capacity is scarce and under this scenario, regulators should encourage such practices because more users will have access to the services and the total user surplus is higher.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we study an ISP's optimal service differentiation strategy subject to its network capacity constraints. We consider two typical scenarios: the fixed capacity and variable capacity scenarios. By incorporating the dual approach in optimal taxation theory [17] , we establish an optimal control framework to analyze the ISP's profit-maximizing problem. We analytically derive the ISP's optimal service differentiation and characterize its structures. Our results show that the ISP's optimal service differentiation scheme offers service classes with sufficiently high qualities and prices such that users with low value will not use the services, even when the network capacity is abundant. Since our model focuses on a single monopolistic ISP, it is unsurprising that the ISP's selfish profitmaximizing strategy may hurt low-end users. To solve this issue, regulators might want to introduce competitions into the market, so that low-end users might have alternative ISPs to choose from. Our results also show that the ISP has strong incentives to implement service differentiation when its capacity is scarce and suggest that regulators should encourage such practices as they increase the total user surplus. Besides, when the ISP expands capacity, its market share will be increased by offering more premium service classes and reducing prices. Furthermore, when there exist more high-value users, the ISP should focus on them by offering a narrower range of premium service classes and charging higher prices.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose q(·)
is not nonincreasing in θ, then there exist two user types θ 1 and θ 2 such that θ 1 > θ 2 and q(θ 1 ) > q(θ 2 ). Let q 1 = q(θ 1 ), q 2 = q(θ 2 ), p 1 = p(q 1 ) and p 2 = p(q 2 ). Since the pricing function p(·) is strictly decreasing, we have p 1 < p 2 . By the definition of user's choice function q(·), we have the following two incentive inequalities:
And they are equivalent to:
, which contradicts with that θ 1 > θ 2 .
Proof of Lemma 2:
Since the utility function (1) has (a variant of) the strict single crossing differences properties 9 [16] :
and satisfies | ∂u(p,q;θ) ∂θ | = v(q) ≤ 1, we can apply the constraint simplification theorem (see [16, Th. 4.3] ) to immediately derive this lemma. 9 Note that in general economics literature the single crossing property requires that the partial derivative ∂ 2 u ∂θ∂q > 0. We flip the inequality here because smaller q means higher quality in our model.
Proof of Lemma 3:
Since u(p, q; θ = 0) = −p ≤ 0 and u(0, 1; θ = 0) = 0 (choosing the dummy service class), we have V * (0)=0. We remark that Lemma 3 actually holds for all θ ∈ [0,θ] since these users choose to opt out of the ISP's services, which immediately follows Theorem 1.
Proof of Lemma 4:
The crux is to perform summation in a user-wise fashion instead of the class-wise one:
Proof of Lemma 5: The envelope theorem [15] together with Lemma 2 have established the one-one correspondence between the any service differentiation strategy and the corresponding user choice function q(·) together with an indirect utility level V (0). Next we represent the ISP's profit maximization problem using the dual approach.
For the fixed capacity scenario, Lemma 3 states that V (0) = 0 under the optimal service differentiation. By the envelope theorem, the first order derivative of V (·) is given by
It naturally follows Lemma 4 that the capacity constraint can be formulated as
For the variable capacity scenario, the difference is that we do not have an inequality constraint on network capacity. Instead, the ISP's profit is penalized by the cost of purchasing capacity W (1). Therefore the ISP's profit is given by J = Proof of Theorem 1: In Section IV-C, we have introduced the three steps of tackling the optimal control problem (13) . In particular, we have proven that the candidate optimal control q(·) for the relaxed optimal control problem is the point-wise maxima of
The shadow price μ satisfies the slackness condition: If W (1) − C M = 0, the slackness condition gives μ > 0, and q(·) is the point-wise maxima of
When θ ∈ [0, θ 0 ), G(θ) < 0 and Ψ(θ, q) is decreasing in q. Therefore q(·) = 1 for all θ ∈ [0, θ 0 ). When θ > θ 0 , we calculate the partial derivative with respect to q to find the maxima.
is determined by h(q) − G(θ)/μ. Then under Assumption 3, we have
where h −1 (·) is the extended inverse function of h(·) over [h (1) , +∞]. Moreover, we have that the marginal user iŝ (1)). Thus far we have completed the first step, i.e. to solve the candidate optimal control q(·) for the relaxed optimal control problem. Next we prove that q(·) is indeed the optimal control of the relaxed optimal control problem. Since the the Hamiltonian H (15) is concave in V and W , the optimization problem satisfies the condition of the Arrow sufficiency theorem [4] . Under this circumstance, the maximum principle is a sufficient condition and q(·) is the optimal control of the relaxed optimal control problem.
The third step is to check the monotonicity of q(·). q(·) is constant over [0,θ). Under Assumption 2 and 3, G(·) is increasing and h −1 (·) decreasing on [θ, 1]. Thus we have that q(·) is nonincreasing on θ ∈ [0, 1] and q * (·) = q(·). The final piece of the proof is to check the existence and uniqueness of the solution to the following set of equations given that C M <C.
To this end, we define the function
and proceed to analyze its continuity and monotonicity. Continuity: Let μ, μ ∈ (0, 1/h(1)), and q * (θ), q * (θ),θ,θ be the corresponding user choice and marginal user type given by equation a and b. In our subsequent analysis we treat μ as fixed and μ varies in an deleted neighborhood of μ. Then we have
When h(1) = 0, thenθ =θ = θ 0 . In this case, (19) transforms to
It is obvious that the right hand side of the above equation can be made arbitrarily small if μ is close enough to μ. When h(1) > 0, without loss of generality we assume μ < μ, thenθ <θ. We can obtain the following inequality from equation (19) : Comparing the above conditions with those in the fixed capacity scenario, we notice that the marginal cost S ( W (1)) at the optimal capacity consumption level W (1) plays the same role as the shadow price μ in the fixed capacity scenario. Letting C * = W * (1) and μ = S (C * ) and applying the three steps in the proof of Theorem 1, we can derive the following set of equations:
a) The user choice function: Integrating by parts, we have 
